In the second round Matan Ruak (TMR) won with 61% to Lu’olo’s 39%. (Figures rounded).

This was a very strong win for TMR, beyond what the figures show: however it is a win that still leaves some basic questions unanswered. Below are some notes on based on observations from afar and chats with contacts in TL on the elections, and on the prospects for new emerging forces to play a role.

At a raising of the PST flag in a village Timor, 2011.

 Reading the results?

The absence of any ongoing, reliable polling processes as well as of an extensive media, including district based media, makes it very difficult for the outside observer (and perhaps also even Timorese political actors) to know for sure what the mass of the population are thinking about politics. The majority of the population lives in rural village communities, more-or-less based on subsistence agriculture, geo-politically separated from the gossip-intense hot house of Dili (and even Bacau). An outside observer, such as myself, is very dependent on information and judgments of Timorese contacts, in whose judgments one has confidence.

FRETILIN’s failure to rebuild after 2007 vote collapse

 In Timor Leste’s first election, FRETILIN scored 60% of the vote. In the second election, it collapsed to 29%. FRETILIN has not been able to rebuild after this collapse. (FRETILIN today, although claiming continuity with the revolutionary FRETILIN of 1975, is essentially a moderate-to-conservative social democratic party, promoting a private sector led development strategy for TL and with a very electoralist perspective on political change. In relates to the Australian Labour Party in Australia. At its last party congress it invited the tycoon capitalist head of Suharto’s former party,  GOLKAR, Aburizal Bakrie. It was the party that legislated lifelong pensions for all members of the first parliament, gave the telecommunications to a private monopoly majority owned by Portugeuse, and followed closely most of the recipes from the IMF and World Bank on financial matters.)

Lu’Olo’s Fretilin’s vote of first round vote of 28% is almost the same as it received in the first round presidential elections in 2007. In 2007, in the second round, FRETILIN won 30%, whereas this time Lu’olo won 39%. For various reasons the 39% vote must be seen as a major failure for FRETILIN and its “allies” this time around.

Pro-FRETILIN optimists may see this vote can be seen as evidence of resilience of Fretilin’s support. However, FRETILIN has worked very hard over the last four years to improve its standing and popularity. It has carried out a consistent strategy of putting itself forward as the alternative government, strongly attacking the current government for incompetence and being riddled with corruption, or at least unable to handle corruption. It has campaigned consistently to renew its image and authority in the districts throughout this period. Last year, it carried out an exercise of a public process of a mass direct vote for its leadership by its whole claimed membership – for President and Secretary-General – to show it had transparent processes and the its leadership was close to the masses. The vote elected Lu’olo ad Fretilin president and Mari Alkatiri as Secretary-General – there were no other candidates.  It claimed that more than 100,000 members voted. This represented more-or-less 100% of those who had voted for FRETILIN in the 2007 and 2012 elections – if indeed the claim was not an exaggeration.

During the 1^st Round Presidential campaign, Fretilin also made it a point to characterize Taur Matan Ruak as not only supported by Xanana Gusmao, whom they have been strongly opposing and criticising, but aligned with him, calling Matan Ruak a “stooge” of the Prime Minister.

So another reading of these 2012 votes is that Fretilin’s strategy, tactics and campaigns since 2007 has not resulted in any substantial improvement in its level of support. This can, perhaps, also be interpreted as an inability by Fretilin to win support for its style of opposition to the current Xanana-led government – despite the many failings of the government. The failure of Lu’olo to increase his vote despite the hard campaigning of Fretilin and Lu’olo over the last four years must raise the question as to whether Fretilin has reached its maximum level of support.

In 2007, Lu’Olo’s first round vote increased from 28 to 30% in the 2^nd round, i.e. basically stayed the same. In 2012 it increased from 28% to 39%. However, this more substantial increase was despite the defacto support of Ferdinand Araujo (Lasama) from the Democratic Party, from president Jose Ramos Horta and from the Social Democratic Party as well as maverick FRETILIN figures such as Lobato. In the first round their combined vote was over 40%, yet Lu’Olo’s vote only increased 10-11%. These figures made public statements of neutrality, but the universal talk on the ground was that were supporting FRETILIN and having joint meetings with FRETILIN. (see more comments below)

I think it is very likely that the actual FRETILIN vote stayed at 28%, or even decreased.

The inability of FRETILIN to rebuild after the 2007 collapse, despite a very aggressive, adversarial campaign against the Xanana government is likely to set in motion a dynamic where FRETILIN’s position and influence decreases further, continuing the trend towards collapse.

The non-Fretilin vote

 As in 2007, 70% of voters did not vote for other non-FRETILIN candidates in the 1^st round and 60% in the 2^nd round.  But also at least 50% voted for candidates that were not putting themselves forward in a way where there was clear linkage with the question of whom should be in government. In fact, this lack of a clear linkage with the question of who governs probably can be said to apply to the whole 70%. This link is clear in Lu’Olo/Fretilin’s case, but not for anybody else.

It could be argued that Xanana’s clear identification with TMR in his campaign linked TMR with Xanana and CNRT. To the extent that this is true, TMR’s first round vote of 23% was less than FRETILIN’s indicating also that Xanana also has been unable to build upon his 2007 vote, when CNRT also scored about the same figure.

Most of the lesser candidates could not claim to be a part of any strategy to win government. Matan Ruak, though he received support from Xanana Gusmao, did not come forward as a CNRT candidate, but was rather mobilizing his prestige as a former guerilla leader and then commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.  Much of his explanations in the lead up to the campaign distanced himself from any one party. Fretilin’s criticism of Matan Ruak as a ‘stooge’ of Xanana, in fact, may have started a process of making his candidature more partisan based. Fretilin’s very adversarial approach to other political forces – who have actually no ideological or platform differences with it – often accelerates polarisation. According to the contacts I speak with, the campaign speeches of the two candidates were laced with ample attacks on each other.

Ferdinand Araujo as leader of PD has been an important part of the current coalition government, but he too had sent out signals that this may not continue.

(1)    Jose Ramos Horta and Ferdinand Araujo

Both these men, whose combined 1^st round vote comes to 35%, have stated they are neutral in the Presidential elections and have urged their supporters to vote for whomever they like. Horta, the current President and a man of considerable stature, has repeatedly stated, even during the 1^st round campaign period and before, that he considers both Lu’olo and Matan Ruak equally qualified and good candidates for President. It appears – at least from a distance- that after talks between Horta and Araujo, Araijo has also adopted a neutral stance.

There have been any reports and analysis circulating, on the internet and by word of mouth, that Horta and Araujo are contemplating forming an alliance and that they are moving towards, or have already decided to consider supporting a Fretilin alliance government after the parliamentary elections. The circulation of these reports may operate to counter-balance their public statements of neutrality, in the sense that many commentators and politicos are now speaking of them as part of an emerging coalition with Fretilin and that they really support Lu’olo’s campaign. However, given Fretilin’s inability to go above 28% in the 1^st round even after 4 years of campaign work, a full-blooded campaign by the two men in support of Lu’olo may have been needed to produce a real increase in the vote for Lu’olo, instead of the ambiguous neutral-public, supportive-private policy.

There may be more to this new development and President Horta’s cooperation with Araujo. Horta won his impressive 18% vote with no support from an established, national political party or machine. While part of his vote may be due to some strong loyalties in particular districts, it is his role as a non-partisan, peace-maker that is the basis of the broader authority he has won as the main form of his long participation in the struggle for independence. His decision to pardon the men who shot him in the back is one of the most dramatic symbols of this role. At the moment, the “platform” being adopted by Horta and Araujo is also one of “non-partisanship, and peace-making”. They proclaim that both Presidential candidates are equally good men. President Horta’s early criticisms of the election process has been allegations made in relation to physical intimidation by some of Matan Ruak’s supporters. As a result of these statements, Horta has won a public commitment by both Lu’Olo and Matan Ruak on March 30 that their supporters would not engage in such activities.

Many of the circulating reports analysing and speculating these developments are suggesting that in the June elections a “3^rd block” comprising the parties ASDT (until his recent death headed by Timor’s 1^st president, Xavier Amaral), PD and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), including Ramos Horta will emerge competing with both FRETILIN and CNRT, but more open to cooperation with FRETILIN than with CNRT. If this indeed develops, it would seem likely that such a bloc would include as part of its “branding”, a non-partisanship, and peace-making approach. This would contrast with both Fretilin’s aggressive adversarial style as well as Xanana Gusmao’s active campaigning for Matan Ruak, and his own adversarial response to Fretilin. Such a bloc would be able to make use of President Horta’s reputation in that area.

But such a bloc would also have to make its positions on other policies clear, and the records of both FRETILIN and CNRT but also PD and PSD, who have been part of the current government. It will be impossible to remain non-partisan. In fact, it is likely that President Horta’s intervention into the party political process may have already weakened his authority and charisma as a peace-maker diplomat standing above the party fray. This may also be one of the reason’s for the minimal support for Lu’Olo from former voters for Horta.

(2) Xanana Gusmao and CNRT

Xanana Gusmao and CNRT clearly supported Matan Ruak in both rounds, along with the Socialist Party of Timor (PST). In his post-victory speech, TMR gave specific thanks to both the CNRT and PST. (In the first round, the PST effectively split its vote between Horta and TMR, but all PST votes went to TMR in the 2^nd round. In villages where PST has a majority, the vote for TMR is reported to be 90%). What is not yet clear to such a long distance observer such as myself is what has been the content of either CNRT’s or TMR’s campaigning.

While the campaigning framework has been essentially for the position of President – who is NOT the head of government – the campaigning has not focussed on government policies. The sharp conflict at the moment between FRETILIN and CNRT has not yet produced a clear for-and-against policy framework.  Mutual recrimination seems to be dominant.

TMR did keep to his general manifesto, however this is formulated in a fairly general way and is not too dissimilar in its basics from other parties. (In fact, 90% of the TL parties have a similar general approach to economic development strategy, i.e. private sector driven.) I have also heard reports that TMR made regular criticisms of the life-long pensions for members of parliament, introduced by the FRETILIN majority parliament before 2007.

The question of what policy questions (no doubt to be taken from the Strategic Development Plan) CNRT and Xanana Gusmao emphasise in campaigning between now and the June elections will be one factor determining how the 70% non-Fretilin constituency will vote. With both FRETILIN and probably also CNRT stagnating, or even declining, in the mid to low 20% range, what other smaller parties do may also be important. (I don’t include PD here. I think it has become too fractured internally, and now too compromised in terms of where it actually stands, that it is likely also to be a spent force.)

At its most recent congress,, CNRT passed a resolution that it would not govern again in coalition. Xanana stated that he would rather be in opposition that rule via coalition again. He has had to govern with whatever talent (or lack of it) that his coalition partners have provided and in a constant state of internal negotiations and bargaining. To do this CNRT needs to win at least 50% of the vote. If indeed Fretilin has plateaued at 30% then theoretically/mathematically this is not impossible. CNRT has to get 50% of that remaining 70%. However, the fact that Xanana’s support for Matan Ruak did not result in a vote better than 23%, also makes this very unlikely. If a 3^rd bloc does emerge (Horta-ASDT-PD-PSD), this will make it harder, it would seem mathematically, for CNRT to win that 50%.

It is very likely that if FRETILIN and CNRT both score somewhere in the 20%+ range, they will need a coalition with the smaller parties, (or each other).

Separate from any assessment we might make now as to whether this is likely, if Xanana and CNRT are serious about ruling in their own right and winning 50% of that 70%, then it would natural for us to assume that they have some campaign strategy to try to do that. If this is the case, what is it? Is it the case? I don’t know the answer to either of these questions.

But the campaign strategies for winning government are not yet clear for any of the non-Fretilin parties.

New emerging forces

 As  I noted above, with both FRETILIN and probably also CNRT stagnating, or even declining, in the mid to low 20% range, what other smaller parties do may also be important. It could be that 50-60% of the vote may be divided among several smaller parties. In its recent new edition of Suara Sosialis Timur newspaper (now being published fortnightly), the Socialist Party of Timor (PST) has stated it is aiming to win 10 seats, up from its current zero. The PST has underwent an impressive expansion during the last 4-5 years, emphasizing methods such as intensive political education, door-to-door campaigning, building its university student organisation FRESTI (now important in its campaign work), and establishing model agricultural cooperatives. It has no doubt also benefited from the platform that its President, Avelino Coelho, was won with rural audiences through his role as Secretary of State for Energy Policy, responsible for the provision of free electrification in remote villages (via solar panels, as well as bio-fuel and bio-energy managed by Beneficiary Assemblies, successfully reaching around 15,000 households, delivering night-time lighting and other low-energy facilities to probably around 75,000 household members. Where such households were previously using kerosene as fuel, they have been saving $1 per day since the free electricity has been available.)

Can the PST win 10 seats? It is not impossible. From what I have seen in TL and based on statistical data provided by and conversations with their activists, it seems that they have a very good chance of winning at least 3-6 seats. They have consolidated their base support in a number of areas. The parliamentary results cannot be automatically extrapolated from the presidential elections. While the stagnation trend for FRETILIN and the weak 1^st round showing for TMR indicate that there is no clear leading force or personalities and that perhaps 40-50% of the vote is up for grabs, what happens in July will be now determined by what everybody actually does – how they campaign.

I think the most interesting thing to watch is how new, emerging forces – such as the PST – will campaign.

Talking to PST activists and from visits, it is clear that the PST is strong in: Atabae, the sucos of HATAS, Rairobo, Sanirin, Leolima and Leohitu; in Manatuto, Kairui, Bathara, Sananain; in Ermera, Estado, Mertutu, Raimerhei, Ponilala, Samara, Katrai Kraik, Katrai Leten, Leggimea, Mau Ubo, Lisapat, Lauana, Humboe, Batumanu, Koliati, Hatulia Vila, Manusae, and others; in Viqueque, Waguia ( but in Waguia, Lu Olo won, while Taur got 190 votes) , Bahatata, Laline, Ahiki, Ira Bin de Cima, Ira Bin de Baixo; Ainaro, Edi, Manetu, Aituto, Manelobas,; in Same, Aitnua, Mindelo, Foholau, Beremana, Liu Rai, Orana. PST has its base committees in nearly 100 Sucos. In those one hundred sucos, Taur won a large majority of votes, in some cases 90%.

On the Socialist Party of Timor. (To be continued next week)

Critical Perspectives on

Contemporary Southeast Asian Politics And Society:

Politics and International Studies, Victoria University and Asia Institute, University of Melbourne

2012 Seminar Series, convened by Dr Max Lane

This seminar series, organised by the Asia Institute at the University of Melbourne and Politics and International Studies, Victoria University , is aimed at creating a forum for following and discussing contemporary political, economic and social developments in the Southeast Asian region. It is hoped that the series, which began in 2nd Semester 2011, will continue into the long-term. The series draws on presenters based in Melbourne, as well as in other parts of Australia and overseas.

While presentations are encouraged that relate directly to a researcher’s current specific research focus, the series is also keen to hear presentations on contemporary developments that flow from lecturers’ and researchers’ general knowledge of the region and their ongoing observation and analysis of developments.

This semester’s program of six seminars includes presentations on Indonesia, including West Papua, the Philippines, Thailand and Timor Leste. Presenters include intellectuals from Indonesia and Timor Leste visiting Australia.

Seminars are held at 5pm on a Wednesday. The presentation by Avelino Coelho, from Timor Leste, will be on a THURSDAY. Most seminars will be held in Room 321, Asia Institute, Level 3, Sidney Myer Asia Centre, Swanston Street, University of Melbourne. 

For further information: please contact Asia Dr Max Lane (maxwell.lane@vu.edu.au ) or Dr Michael Ewing (mce@unimelb.edu.au)

kekuasaan diatas
membawa celaka!
ya, sudah tahu itu
terus gimana kalau begitu?

kebolongan
bergema rhetorika
sunyi
kosong bunyi

Review by Prof James Peacock, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill).

Dia tidak meninggalkan sebuah surat yang menjelaskan niatnya dia  tentang tindakan mengambil nyawanya sendiri dengan cara yang penuh penderitaan ini. Mungkin Sondang  mau menunjukkan rasa cemasnya yang dalam bahwa sebagian besar rakyat Indonesia masih menderita kemiskinan. Sondang aktif di organisasi mahasiswa Himpunan Advokasi-Study Marhaenis Muda untuk Rakyat dan Bangsa Indonesia (Hammurabi). Dia juga memimpin komunitas Sahabat Munir. Dia membakar diri di depan Istana Kepresidenan, mungkin ingin mengatakan presiden Yudhoyono sebagai kepala pemerintahan yang  “gagal mensejahterakan rakyat.”  Mungkin juga dia terinspirasi oleh kasus seorang pedagang kaki lima Tunisia (Marhaen Tunisia) yang melakukan hal yang sama yang kemudian memicu pemberontakan oposisi di negeri tersebut, sehingga Presidennya jatuh.

Bisa saja terjadi – dan memang sudah terjadi – debat atau diskusi tentang benar atau salahnya tindaknya Sondang ini. Tetapi mengingat rekor kegiatan Sondang, minimal kita harus menghormati dia dan mengenangnya sebagai orang yang sanggup mengorbankan nyawanya dan menderitakan kesakitan fisik yang luar biasa dalam harapan bahwa ini akan berguna buat rakyat Indonesia.

Karena itu aku salut pada saudara Sondang, mahasiswa Universitas Bung Karno  yang pernah gerak buat kaum marhaen dan korban pelanggaran HAM. Saya membaca juga bahwa dia pernah juga terlibat aktivitas solidaritas dengan rakyat Papua korban kekerasan. Sekali lagi salut!

Dinamika Menghadapi Kegagalan Mensejahteraan Rakyat

 Di Morocco kasus orang membakar diri memicu sebuah pemberontakan oposisi yang massif. Di Indonesia belum jelas sepenuhnya bagaimana nanti dampak daripada tindakan Sondang. Teman-teman mahasiswanya dari UBK sudah mengaraknya ramai-ramai ke kuburan. Ada versi bahwa lagu DARAH JUANG yang didedikasikan ke Sondang. Universitas mengangkatnya dengan pemberian gelar kehormatan. Mahasiswa-mahasiwa menyatakan tekad untuk meneruskan perjuangannya Sondang melawan pimpinan hedonis.  Simpati sangat meluas, meski juga ada yang mempertanyakan tindakannya sebagai perbuatan politik. Kita belum tahu sepenuhnya bagaimana warisan perbuatan dia ke depan.

Dalam perbandingan Indonesia dengan Tunisia (atau Mesir) bisa kita catat suatu hal yang berbeda yang akan mempengaruhi situasi. Di Morocco pada saat  Mohammed Bouazizi membakar diri, masyarakat Tunisia sedang di cengkeraman seorang diktator. Mahasiswa dan rakyat Indonesia sudah memaksa diktator Indonesia selama 33 tahun – Suharto – turun pada tahun 1998, 14 tahun yang lalu. Situasi kondisi politik bukan sebuah kondisi yang tegang menunggu sesuatu yang akan memicu kemarahan anti-kediktatoran meledak.  Solusi pada kedikatatoran gampang dirumuskan dengan tepat (meski belum tentu gampang menerapkan rumusannya). Kediktatoran bisa dihilangkan dengan turunkan diktator. Tunisia (dan Mesir) sudah lama menunggu pemicu penurunan diktator mereka. Di Indonesia, dari tahun 1989 sampai 1996 proses membangun gerakan anti-diktatoran tanpa pemicu dramatis, berkat jerih-payah aktivis-aktivis yang membangun organisasi, termasuk yang selalu di depan aktivis-aktivis Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD), periode 1994-1999.

Bom kemarahan kalau sudah meledak, asal diarahkan, bisa jatuhkan diktator. Tetapi seperti  yang sedang dialami di Tunisia dan Mesir, dan juga sudah dialami Indonesia selama 14 tahun, jatuhnya kediktatoran  membuka ruang  gerak yang lebih luas. Kita kemudian dihadapkan dengan masalah bagaimana mengisi ruang tersebut degan sebuah gerakan yang akan memperjuangkan perubahan yang lebih jauh lagi. Pemicu-pemicu yang ditunggu ialah pemicu yang membangun rakyat berorganisasi secara massal dan massif, memperjuangkan kemajuan negerinya, karena elit tak bisa diharapkan sama sekali. (Ini masalah yang dihadapi seluruh negeri di saat ini.) Dan yang bisa mensejahterakan rakyat bukan seorang Presiden tetapi gerakan rakyat sendiri.

Rakyat memang tidak mengharapkan elit, kemudian .. ?

Sering sekali saya lihat di berbagai aksi mahasiswa maupun serikat buruh serangan kritik bahwa pemerintah Presiden Yughoyono gagal mensejahterakan rakyat. Slogan “Megawati-Hamzah Haz gagal”, “Yudhoyono-Kalla gagal” dan sekarang “Yudhoyono-Beodiono gagal” muncul berulang-ulang sejak Megawati Soekarnoputri menjadi presiden. Di pinggir jalan dan di perbincangaan rakyat, pasti mayoritas sudah setuju kesimpulan tersebut. Rakyat sepakat. Tetapi bentuk pemikiran “Yudhoyono-Beodiono gagal”, meskipun sebagai kenyataan adalah benar, sekaligus juga tersesat. Perumusan masalah dalam bentuk si A dan si B gagal sebagai Presiden dengan sendiri mengandung anggapan bahwa ada juga sedang sembunyi di suatu tempat si  C dan si D yang akan berhasil. Secara tidak langsung pendekatan ini masih mengandung unsur “ratu adil”isme.

Presiden Yudhoyono memang sudah pasti gagal mensejahteraan rakyat sejak sebelumnya. Begitu juga semua orang-orang yang lagi dibicarakan sebagai calon presiden tahun 2014. Ada beberapa sebab. Pertama, Yudhoyono dan calon-calon lainnya, semua merupakan perwakilan dari kelas menengah atas Indonesia yang mengukur keberhasilan ekonomi dengan ukuran pertumbuhan kelas menengah dan kelas menegah atas. Itu saja yang harus dicapai. Kelas menengah makmur Indonesia mungkin kurang-lebih 10% dari penduduk Indonesia atau 20an jutaan orang. Yang 200 juta orang lain memang tidak dianggap, asal jangan rusuh atau melawan. Jadi memang tidak ada minat mensejahteraan rakyat, sejak awal. Kadang-kadang pemerintah kelihatan bengong menghadapi masalah-masalah sosial dan ekonomi rakyat: jangan-jangan tidak bengong hanya tidak tertarik saja.

Kedua, kemiskinan rakyat dan keterbelakangan ekonomi Indonesia tidak disebabkan oleh kebijakan-kebijakan pemerintah Indonesia, termasuk yang “neo-liberal”pun atau yang diresep-resepkan oleh lembaga-lembaga keuangan internasional. Kebijakan-kebijakan memang kebanyakan tidak pantas disetujui, tetapi bukan sebagai penyebab atau asal-usul masalah tetapi sebagai hal yang memperparah situasi. Kemiskinan dan keterbelakangan ekonomi Indonesia, dan keterbelakangannya infrastruktur sosio-budaya, berasal dari warisan kolonialisme Hindia Belanda yang meletakan Indonesia sebagai ekonomi neo-koloni yang tak berindustrialisasi. Kemudian ekonomi Indonesia selama Orde Baru ditumbuhkan lagi pakai pola yang sama, bukan sebagai hasil pemaksaan kubu imperialis tetapi atas undangan sukarela kekuasaan pemenang pertaruhan arah pembangunan Indonesia yang berlangsung 1945-65. Indonesia 2011 adalah hasil 33 tahun pola ini, sehingga elit politik-ekonominya tak mungkin akan berminat mensejahterakan rakyat.

Dua lapis “ketidak-ada-harapan”.

Sudah 46 tahun berlalu sejak Orde Baru berdiri. Elit kekuasaan Indonesia sudah terbentuk mapan. Apakah ada harapan elit tersebut akan melahirkan sebuah sayap yang dinamis, bergairah, cinta rakyat, cinta kebenaran, cinta ilmu? Periksa saja partai-partainya mereka dan mengambil kesimpulan sendiri. Kalau kerangka pikiran kita ialah Yudhoyono tak mampu, dengan fokus pada perorangannya dan kebutuhan akan seorang presiden yang lain lagi, sudah pasti akan muncul perasaan: tak ada harapan, harus ada tindakan yang sedrastis-drastisnya.

Ada juga sebuah “ketidak-ada-harapan” lain yang ikut mewarnai suasana. Pada tahun 40an, 50an, 60an, 70an bahkan 80an, baik di Indonesia maupun secara internasional, ada suatu kata, suatu diskursus, suatu visi yang memberi harapan pada semua orang: “Development”, “Pembangunan”. Pada dekade-dekade itu seluruh dunia yakin bahwa negeri negeri “sedang berkembang” akan berkembang, bahwa “development” akan terjadi, bahwa negeri-negeri itu akan mencapai “take-off”.  Yang pesimis dan sabar anggap mungkin ini proses lama melalui “trickle down effect” selama beberapa generasi. Yang optimis mengira “take-off”akan pesat dan heboh. Kaum sosialis yakin gerakan-gerakan pembebasan nasional akan berkembang menjadi revolusi sosialis sehingga akan ada pembangunan sosialis. Di Indonesia sendiri, selama periode Orde Baru, sampai 1997, “pembangunan” menjadi hampir sebuah agama, dan sebuah agama yang formal menjanjikan akselerasi pembangunan 25 tahun.

Pada abad 21 ini, di sebagian besar negeri sedang (tidak) berkembang di dunia, mimpi tentang pembangunan tinggal menjadi mimpinya kelas menengah atas saja. Hanya sedikit negeri, seperti Venezuela misalnya, yang masih memperjuangkan pembangunan buat rakyatnya – atau lebih tepat, rakyat Venezuela sendiri sedang memperjuangkannya. Di banyak negeri-negeri dengan mimpi development menghilang rasa tak ada harapan semakin kental terasa. Tindakan-tindakan drastis, semakin sering terjadi.

Di Indonesia rasa tak ada harapan yang melahirkan tindakan drastis juga yang mengakibatkan beberapa kali orang yang memimpikan dunia yang lain dan lebih baik  melakukan bunuh diri. Berbeda dengan Sondang, orang-orang ini sekaligus membunuh orang lain pula, dengan aksi bom bunuh diri. Tindakan drastis bom bunuh diri dan membunuh nyawa lain ini bukan hanya sakit irrasionil tetapi juga kriminil. Sondang tidak berniat ambil yang nyawa orang lain, tetapi mempertaruhkan nyawanya sendiri.

Membangun harapan

Membangun harapan butuh lebih daripada semacam pengambilan sikap bertekad berjuang. Membangun harapan mebutuhkan pengertian bahwa memang adalah mungkin untuk mencapai kemajuan-kemajuan. Selama gerakan fokus pada menyatakan kekecewaan dengan pimpinan negara yang ada dengan slogan si A dan si B gagal, dengan pesan di dalamnya bahwa si C atau si D, yang bisa selesaikan masalah, tidak akan terbangunkan harapan. Konsekwensi logis dari kesimpulan bahwa elit politik ekonomi negeri tak mampu memimpin atau melakukan pembangunan ialah bahwa hanya yang non-elit akan bisa melakukannya. Yang “non-elit” (marhaen, rakyat miskin, 99% dll) tidak bisa hanya sebagai penerima kesejahteraan tetapi pelaku merebutnya, merencanakannya dan melakukannya.

Dari kesadaran itulah akan datang permulaan dari analisa syarat-syarat yang dibutuhkan untuk yang non-elit bangkit berorganisasi. Dan dari sana akan datanglah harapan.

Contoh Sondang mengingatkan kita betapa dalam bisa seorang manusia merasa peduli tentang rakyatnya. Perasaan dalam tersebut harus digendongkan dengan pengertian dan perencanaan bangkit bersama-sama, supaya tidak perlu lagi dan tidak akan ada orang yang merasa perlu ambil tindakan drastis mengorbankan diri menderita kesakitan dan kehilangan nyawa  demi berusaha memicukan sesuatu yang dia tunggu-tunggu tapi tidak datang. Kekuasaan selalu siap makan korban dari kaum pejuang,  seharusnya tak perlu kita menambah dengan pejuang mengorbankan diri. Hanya bangkit dan berorganisasi bersama-sama -dengan membuang semua harapan pada elit siapapun- memperjuangkan keadilan dan pembangunan akan membangun harapan yang melahirkan tindakan-tindakan berdaya cipta.

Selamat jalan Sondang.

Narrow and dark and most of all hot. If I ended up at a back table, 3 or 4 metres inside, the sweat would pour from forehead and my hair would be wet enough to comb again in just 20 seconds. And the prickly heat itchiness would invade. Better to get a table at front, and visit only at night. So narrow, maybe 2 or 3 metres, and even narrower at the front – maybe one metre or 1.5 metres. It was narrower at the front because half the width was taken up with the kitchen. Sitting at the front one was almost being on the footpath. Sabang Street, in central Jakarta, in 1969 was a fun street. It was almost all restaurants, cafes and other eateries, with a row of Chinese owned general stores – also selling smuggled gin – and another row of photocopy shops, so needed for all the documents necessary for almost every activity in Indonesia.

In 69, there were still few cars. Becak trishaws dominated. No traffic, and the uneven sidewalk was enjoyable to walk along. At the right time of the year, small mountains of glowing red and hairy rambutan fruit added both visual and taste colour. The Padang restaurants still sold juicy, chilli spicy, beef rendang coated in its rich, thick, deep black coconut sauces. In the back lane that run along behind the shops, in the midst of jammed in, crammed in, packed in semi-slum houses, the kitchens cooking the rendang let out a steam engine sound as the huge stoves applied their massive heat to the giant drums of stewing beef, and coconut and chilli and a hundred other spices. And the aroma …..

The Chinese restaurants were more then than now. One on the corner with Wahid Hasyim Street had a nice courtyard and specialised in selling its own ice-cream. Outside, the footpath was populated by men selling chicken sate with home-made peanut sauce. Directly across the road was another cramped stall, with tables and benches outside selling goat sate, served with sweet soy sauce and chopped chilli. That stall is still there today and still selling its tough but tasty goat meet sate. Only one of the original Chinese restaurants is there today.The thick, black sauce rendang cooking padang restaurants have gone to be replaced by pallid replacements. And now cars smother the street.

But back to the narrow, dark, sauna of an eatery, only 2 or 3 metres wide. My visits to that place are one of those experiences whose memory seems to remain vivid no matter how much time passes. i can almost feel the prickly heat and sweat attacking my scalp at this very moment, as I sit here in a mildly air-conditioned room.

Narrow and dark and there was the roaring sound like a steam train engine blasting out of the tiny kitchen that was located at the front of the cafe. The massive kerosene stove inside was scolding the heavy metal, giant wok as either noodles or rice was tossed and turned, and scooped and stirred and mixed with spices and sauces and oils in an era before mono-sodium glutamate had completed its invasion of Indonesia from Japan. The roaring sound never stopped, a raucous muzak to accompany a gleaming plate of taste heaven.

Fried rice. Gleaming with what was no doubt the forbidden pork lard, mixed with other oils as well. Plain, with tiny flecks of vegies, and maybe chicken, or if you ordered it, crab meat. Try – but you can’t any more, of course – the fried rice with chopped pete beans with their methane gas like smell, when you eat it and when you pass it out later, with their delicious vinegar, pungent addition to the savory plate of gleaming, steaming hot fried rice.

But I often wondered if it was indeed the lard or the chinese spices or the massive heat on the heavy wok where the rice was tossed and turned with amazing speed that made this food the heaven to eat that it was.

I occasionally caught a glimpse of the hectic activity inside the kitchen, when the tiny window in the thin wall between the front table and where the stove and wok stood was opened to pass out a plate of food.. I could see the chef. He was old and thin but clearly strong to almost be able to wave that huge wok around, throwing the rice into the air again and again to turn it. Thin iron muscles in the arms – aching, exhausted arms too, no doubt. You could see the ridges of his rib cage through his thin singlet. Stark collarbones shaped his shoulders. He wore shorts. He was Chinese but with white hair. A middle aged woman helped him ready the food on the plate.

Was that the secret of his food, rice or noodles? (That was all he sold). His unity with the surrounds. Rice, wok, heat, hands on wok, arms with body, body with floor, skin with heat – his sweat poured off him, drenching his singlet. The kitchen must have been as hot as hell, and as red with flames and as noisy as well. Maybe it was not the lard, or salt, or sugar or spices, but drops of precious sweat from human labour that spiced the food with deliciousness.

And I paid for it far less than it was worth, and nowhere near enough for the pleasure it gave.